Gå på – The Karoliner Way of War

At the opening of the Great Northern War, Sweden faced a problem that was at once military and political. Its empire was spread across the Baltic, its population and revenue were limited, and its enemies could replace casualties more readily than it could. Charles XII’s field army was disadvantaged in a slow contest of attrition. It sought decision before numerical weight, artillery, and a long campaign reduced its advantages. The familiar Swedish answer was gå på—literally “go at them”: an order to keep moving through fire and bring the enemy to close combat. But that order was only the visible end of a much larger system.

The Karoliner Way of War brought a standing provincial establishment, intensive drill, controlled fire, rapid advance, and close combat into one battlefield system. Pike, bayonet, and sword were intended to turn disorder into flight, while tactical action aimed above all to break morale. The combination worked when each element reinforced the others against an enemy whose formation or confidence could be broken quickly. It failed when an assault lost cohesion, met prepared obstacles and deep reserves, or became entangled in a war that Sweden could no longer sustain materially.1

An offensive battlefield system

The modern label Karoliner (or Caroleans) describes the soldiers of Charles XI and Charles XII throughout both reigns; it does not denote a special corps invented by the latter king. Their striking tactical reputation grew out of institutions built before 1700 and was refined in war. Its offensive core nonetheless requires precision. Swedish infantry and cavalry moved at different paces according to circumstances. The system sought to control the sequence of combat. It denied the enemy a long interval in which to fire, reload, adjust, and recover confidence; it used a short, close fire action to disturb his line; and it demanded that the Swedish unit cross the remaining distance before the disturbance could be repaired.

That sequence explains the place of firepower. A battalion with muskets, powder, bayonets, and trained platoons was expected to fire effectively, but fire served the moment of contact. European armies combined fire and close combat in different proportions; for Sweden, a long exchange of volleys was a poor bargain when a local collapse was needed quickly. The Swedish method therefore, concentrated its fire into the final approach and made movement, rather than reloading, the next task. 

The preferenc for rapid decision was rooted in strategy, not temperament. The Swedish field army operated in an environment where time favoured its enemies. The objective was to dislocate an opponent’s ability and willingness to resist, rather than merely gain a few hundred yards. That is why the doctrine placed such a premium on surprise, tempo, close-order advance, and the initiative of officers once the firing began. It also helps explain why the same army could be dangerous at Narva, in Poland, or at Fraustadt without being invulnerable in Russia. The method addressed a particular tactical problem while remaining subject to terrain, logistics, and numbers.2

Johann Philipp Lemke, Charles XII Crossing the Düna (early eighteenth century). The controlled, heroic scene preserves the Swedish offensive ideal as an image of command and momentum rather than a literal tactical sequence.(Wikimedia Commons / Public Domain).

Sweden’s emphasis on rapid decision-making remained part of a wider European tactical world. Swedish armies had already acquired a European reputation for offensive battle in the Thirty Years’ War, but the Carolean method differed from Gustavus Adolphus’s practice. Seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century armies across Europe still expected infantry to advance, cavalry to strike, and battle to be decided by the combination of fire and close combat. Shock was already a European military practice. What distinguished the Carolean system was the unusual consistency with which Swedish drill, weapons mix, command expectations, and battlefield application drove toward a rapid decision in close combat. Its distinctiveness lay in emphasis and integration rather than complete isolation from European military development.3

The wider, recurring problem of how commanders use fire, movement, and morale to create a decisive shock is explored in our earlier essay, From Cataphract to Tank. The Karoliner way of war was one particularly disciplined early-modern answer to that problem.

The machine that produced the advance

The charge began long before a battalion entered musket range. Charles XI’s indelningsverk, or allotment system, gave the crown a more dependable basis for maintaining regiments than episodic conscription. Farms grouped into a rote supported an infantry soldier; cavalry were supported through the rusthåll system. Supporting householders normally remained on their farms. They were responsible for providing and maintaining the soldier, his dwelling, pay, clothing, and replacement. Provinces undertook to keep regiments at an agreed establishment in peace as well as war. 4

Sweden still relied on enlisted units, foreign troops, emergency levies, and money; the allotment system nevertheless gave many national regiments a durable local identity. Men trained, marched, and suffered alongside neighbours from the same district under officers who expected to know their unit. Field strength, experience, equipment, and leadership still varied sharply over a twenty-one-year war. The system nevertheless provided the social frame within which drill and mutual obligation could become practical battlefield discipline rather than parade-ground display.5

Drill was the indispensable bridge. The infantry regulation prescribed more than weapons: hand movements, ranks, intervals, turns, loading procedures, pike handling, and the coordination of officers, non-commissioned officers, drummers, colours, musketeers, grenadiers, and pikemen. A battalion had to be capable of closing files, firing by designated ranks, recovering alignment, and moving again while shots fell around it. The regulation’s insistence on regular timing and repeated practice shows the practical point: a battlefield system that depended on a few minutes of ordered action could not survive hesitation at the level of a company or file.6

The opening of the 1701 Swedish infantry regulation. Its first chapter sets out the formation of regiments and battalions and the introduction of colours: the administrative and drill foundation beneath the celebrated charge. (Tartu University Library facsimile / Public Domain).

Discipline, therefore, had a narrower and more useful meaning than blind obedience. It was the ability to preserve formation while men were frightened, tired, deafened, and partially blinded by powder smoke. Officers and non-commissioned officers maintained direction; colours gave the formation a visible centre; pikes and muskets had assigned places; the cadence made individual steps collective. The Swedish advance drew its power from reducing the tactical consequences of fear before the unit reached its critical distance. A man who stayed in his place helped protect the man beside him. A man who ran opened a gap through which enemy fire, cavalry, and panic could enter.

That is also the proper foundation for Carolean morale. Religious language, royal example, regimental identity, honour, confidence born of victories, and severe wartime experience all contributed. Taken separately, none of these factors explains Swedish courage across time. Drill and combat action also produced morale tactically. The soldier who had repeatedly performed a drill knew what came after the order to advance. The battalion, which remained closed after its first losses, was itself evidence to its members that it had not yet been beaten. Conversely, an enemy line that hesitated, fired badly, or showed openings offered an immediate and visible proof that it could be broken.

The system also connected tactical reliability to administration. A regiment could preserve its form in action only if its men had suitable weapons, its officers had time to train them, and losses could be replaced without dissolving the unit into strangers. The indelningsverk helped with those tasks by making maintenance and replacement an assigned responsibility rather than an improvised wartime demand. Its capacity to replace veteran experience was limited. Replacements could fill a nominal establishment; they could not instantly reproduce the confidence acquired by a company that had marched, drilled, and fought together for years. The longer the war lasted, the wider that gap became. A doctrine that depended upon disciplined speed was unusually sensitive to the erosion of experienced cadres.7

Fire as the prelude to contact

The Swedish infantry’s weapons make the doctrine clearer. A company at its nominal establishment combined musketeers, pikemen, and grenadiers: one prescribed arrangement gave eighty-four musketeers, forty-eight pikemen, and twelve grenadiers. Field strengths naturally varied. In battle, the battalion normally formed four ranks deep, with the pikemen in the centre and musketeers on the flanks. The pike still gave the formation reach and cohesion at close quarters, even as the expanding use of the bayonet reduced its comparative advantage. Musketeers carried bayonets and swords as well. The resulting battalion was designed to employ firearms and edged weapons in one continuous assault.8

The prescribed attack sequence was more elaborate than the shorthand phrase “one volley and a charge.” At about seventy paces, the rear ranks prepared, closed up behind the front, and fired. They then drew swords as the battalion continued forward in close order. At about thirty paces, the front ranks fired; after that, they too drew swords, and the battalion charged. Later practice could bring the second discharge still closer, and actual battle could compress, alter, or omit the formal sequence. The design concentrated tightly rationed fire at the point immediately before contact, rather than using preparatory musketry at a safe distance. In this context, gå på meant a regulated movement from controlled fire to immediate contact. 9

Battle of Fraustadt, engraved by Johann Christian Marchand, c. 1706–25. Its key marks the advance of the Royal Swedish infantry and cavalry against a defended Saxon-Russian line. Although it does not record the exact fire sequence, it provides period context for the movement through guns, obstacles, and defensive fire that had to precede contact. (Wikimedia Commons / Public Domain).

The difference was psychological as well as ballistic. An enemy whose fire plan assumed several opportunities to fire and reload had less time to regain control when confronted by a body that remained dressed, absorbed a volley, answered at close range, and did not halt to reload. The first Swedish volley was meant to damage and unsettle; the final discharge made the next visual impression—leveled pikes, drawn swords, fixed bayonets, advancing colours—more threatening. Crossing those last few dozen yards remained dangerous. The decisive effect lay in the possibility that a unit whose officers had lost control, whose files were opening, or whose men believed contact meant slaughter could collapse before the assault physically destroyed it.

The phrase “cold steel” can obscure the musket’s role. Firearms of the period lacked rifle-like precision, yet a controlled close salvo could still have a significant effect on a dense target. More importantly, the volley confirmed that the Swedish battalion was still organized and advancing. Fire and cold steel were consecutive phases of one act. If the fire failed to disturb the enemy, the attackers still had to cross the open ground and fight. If the attackers stopped to exchange fire, they surrendered the doctrine’s main advantage. The system was therefore daring precisely because its tactical economy left little margin for a stalled attack.

Grenadiers illustrate the same principle. They had a practical combat function beyond elite display. Regulations placed them at dangerous points, used them to protect commanders, and specified a sequence of musket fire, grenade, and bayonet. Their employment was situational, but their function was consistent: to reinforce the portion of the formation where a rapid breach, a threatened flank, or a violent local action could decide the larger fight. The system was strongest when its specialised elements amplified the cohesion of the battalion rather than becoming detached spectacles.10

Cavalry: speed, cohesion, and exploitation

The cavalry followed the same psychological logic. Formal exercises still included pistols and carbines, but focused on delivering a sword attack by a compact squadron. A 1695 method envisaged a formation beginning at a trot, firing pistols at close distance if necessary, then drawing swords and closing; circumstances could also justify an immediate attack with cold steel. By the middle years of the war, the final phase increasingly became a gallop. The point was to keep enough cohesion to strike a formed adversary, not to scatter in a loose pursuit of individual shots.11

The often-repeated description of an irresistible Swedish wedge requires qualification. The “plough” or wedge-like pressure could emerge as close-packed troopers pressed inward and forward, and contemporary plans show the importance of compact, multi-rank company formations. Swedish cavalry nevertheless depended on room to form, ground fit for horses, officers able to maintain direction, and infantry or other cavalry to prevent the enemy from concentrating against its flanks. Its value lay in taking a local advantage—an enemy unit disordered by infantry, a wavering cavalry wing, a gap in a line—and turning it into a rout before recovery was possible.

The best use of the two arms was therefore reciprocal. Infantry could fix an enemy, disorder him with its close fire, and open or expose a vulnerable point. Cavalry could exploit the moment before the enemy closed the breach. Cavalry could also clear a flank or force hostile horse away, allowing the infantry to make its assault without being ridden down from the side. Each arm depended on the other. A cavalry charge that failed to break its opponent became expensive and difficult to rally. Infantry that pressed on without protection invited envelopment. Behind the familiar image of the individual charge stood a system that depended on coordination.

Artillery occupied an awkward place in this system. Swedish commanders used guns, including lighter pieces, and could employ them effectively. But artillery’s pace and deployment needs sat uneasily with a doctrine that wanted the line to move from the final volley into immediate contact. The Swedish army could not assume that its guns would prepare for every attack or keep up with rapid exploitation. That choice yielded speed, but it also created a dependency on infantry and cavalry being able to achieve a decision without a prolonged fire preparation. Against an enemy who could use fieldworks and guns to dictate the pace, it was a serious liability.

Why the system worked

The Carolean method succeeded most reliably when it created a contest of confidence rather than a contest of attrition. It made an enemy’s decision point come early. A force which had not drilled well, had weak officers, was surprised, was divided by terrain, or had already been shaken by artillery or cavalry might lose the ability to stand together before hand-to-hand fighting reached its full intensity. Swedish aggressiveness then produced more than a local gain: panic could spread laterally through a line and backward through reserves. The offensive force benefited from a reinforcing loop. Success raised confidence, confidence improved cohesion, and cohesion made the next assault more credible.12

The system also fitted the Swedish strategic predicament. Sweden could use professional skill, surprise, and tactical tempo to compensate temporarily for inferior numbers. Early victories were consequently more than trophies. They were evidence to Swedish soldiers, allies, and enemies that the method could work. A reputation for immediate attack could cause an opponent to withdraw, deploy prematurely, or overestimate the size of an approaching force. In battle, that reputation gave the Swedish line a psychological head start. Firepower and numbers still counted, but the reputation affected the moment when formations had to decide whether to endure contact.

A Dutch engraving of Narva, published by Pieter Mortier in 1702–03. (Rijksmuseum / Public Domain)

This reciprocal relationship between reputation and performance is important. Reputation made the first approach more unsettling for the defender, but it could help the attacker only so long as the Swedish formation actually behaved as expected. The psychological weapon was credible because the army’s drill and previous victories supplied evidence that its officers could make men continue forward. Once repeated defeats, poor supplies, illness, or inexperienced replacements weakened that evidence, the morale advantage could diminish quickly. In this sense Carolean doctrine created a high-performance force, but also placed a premium on preserving the human material that made the performance possible.13

Leadership turned this potential into action. Charles XII’s personal exposure to danger was an important symbol, but effective command still depended on regimental and company officers, non-commissioned officers, and experienced soldiers who kept a unit together when the original plan met smoke, casualties, or terrain. The doctrine required initiative within an understood purpose: take the indicated objective, keep the unit closed, and exploit the enemy’s loss of order. That demanded individuals who could act rapidly without waiting for a new, elaborate order every time a local situation changed.14

Finally, success depended on the selection of circumstances. The Swedish army did not need to accept every position in the same way. A rapid assault worked best where the attacker could approach under some cover, concentrate against a weaker section, coordinate cavalry, and prevent the defender from using depth. It was least attractive where ground, obstacles, and prepared fire compelled the attacker to slow down. The military value of gå på was thus bound to reconnaissance, march discipline, deployment, and command judgment. Calling it “shock tactics” is useful only if shock includes all the arrangements required to make an enemy feel the shock at the decisive place.

The costs and the limits

The doctrine’s greatest strength—its compression of time—was also its danger. A Swedish attack that failed to break the enemy rapidly entered the phase it had tried to avoid. Men were exposed in close order, ammunition was being spent, officers became casualties, and fatigue degraded the ability to maintain pace and alignment. Repeated attacks could display courage, but they could also turn an army’s finest quality into a mechanism for consuming irreplaceable trained men. The courage to continue could not by itself recreate an initial advantage after units had become disordered.

Prepared obstacles were especially damaging. Redoubts, abatis, ditches, and defended gaps forced attackers to bunch, lose alignment, and expose themselves to fire from positions that did not have to yield merely because they were struck. Depth made the problem worse. A first line might waver, but reserves behind it could halt the breakthrough or counterattack the exhausted attackers. Artillery, too, became more decisive when the enemy had time and space to use it. By 1709, Peter I’s army, rebuilt and trained after Narva, combined numbers, formations, fieldworks, mobile troops, and operational patience in ways that denied Sweden the clean decision it sought. Swedish overextension, losses, and supply failures had already narrowed the margin for overcoming those defenses.15

The wider war imposed an even harder limit. The allotment system could sustain a peacetime establishment and fill many losses, but it could not effortlessly replace the experienced field army destroyed by disease, battle, capture, and distance. Provincial identity strengthened morale, yet it also meant that attrition struck real local communities. Swedish operational reach depended on supplies, draft animals, magazines, roads, and allied territory. The Russian campaign demonstrated that a battlefield doctrine cannot compensate indefinitely for a broken logistical system. The army that approached Poltava had been weakened before it reached the field; its artillery was inadequate to the task; and its opponents had prepared a tactical problem that a straightforward assault could not solve.16

An early eighteenth-century Swedish plan of Poltava. Its fieldworks, opposing lines, and depth make visible the sort of prepared tactical problem that denied an attacker a clean, rapid decision; the image illustrates that problem rather than the doctrine itself. (Swedish National Archives / Public Domain).

Under favourable conditions, the Karoliner way of war could achieve a decision efficiently. It offered no universal answer to early modern battle. Its own sources show the importance of firearms, formations, drill, and calculation. Its greatest modern analyst also shows that the supposedly absolute divide between Swedish and Western European tactics was overstated by older nationalist military history. The Swedish army did exploit offensive possibilities with unusual determination. But it did so with weapons, ranks, and tactical problems recognisably shared across Europe.17

Playing the Karoliner way

For a player of Musket & Pike: Great Northern War, this logic translates into a preference for a short, coordinated crisis rather than an indiscriminate rush. In practical terms, gå på means building that crisis before committing to contact. Swedish infantry is best used to close a fight rather than to win a distant firefight. Advance in coherent lines under leaders, keep units mutually supporting, and use fire late—when it prepares a melee you intend to resolve—not as an extended exchange at maximum range. The Swedish melee and morale advantages are most valuable when several battalions can strike one part of an enemy line together; do not feed single battalions into redoubts or steady infantry simply because they are Swedish.

Battle of Pechory (or Peetschora), 23 February 1701, as shown in Musket & Pike: Great Northern War

Keep cavalry on the flanks to screen the advance, deter enemy horse, and exploit a local disorder after the infantry has fixed the target. A cavalry charge can decide a fight, but it is a commitment: its movement generates fatigue, and an exhausted Swedish cavalry arm cannot protect the infantry or exploit the next opportunity. Preserve a reserve, avoid stacking fatigue on the same assaulting command, and keep leaders close enough to help units recover from disorder. In short, play for a short, supported crisis at one point of the line—infantry to create it, cavalry to widen it—rather than a general rush across the whole front.

Conclusion

The Karoliner way of war was successful because it made battlefield morale actionable. Training, formation, close volleys, weapons, leadership, and speed were intended to make the enemy’s fear decisive first. A Swedish battalion was designed to survive the final approach in enough order to deliver fire, show cold steel, and cross the psychological threshold from exchange of shots to a fight that its opponent might no longer wish to face. Swedish cavalry applied the same principle at greater speed: compactness first, fire only as a means, and the sword attack as the decision.

That system could be extraordinarily effective, particularly against armies not yet able to combine discipline, depth, fire, and prepared ground. It could also be ruinous when those conditions were absent. Its enduring significance lies in Sweden’s unusually coherent answer to a real strategic problem, and in the limits revealed when war became a contest of resources, preparation, and time.

Bibliography

Artéus, Gunnar. Krigsteori och historisk förklaring. II: Karolinsk och europeisk stridstaktik 1700-1712. Meddelanden från Historiska institutionen i Göteborg 5. Lidköping: Exlibria, 1972.

Charles XII. Förordning och reglemente för infanteriet som den stormäcktigste konung och herre, herr Carl den XII Sveriges, Götes och Wändes konung, &c. &c. har författa och alle wederbörande til effterrättelse af trycket utgå låtit. Reval: Christoph Brendeken, 1701.

Frost, Robert I. The Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558-1721. 2nd ed. London and New York: Routledge, 2014.

Kling, Stephen L., Jr., ed. The Great Northern War Compendium. 2 vols. St. Louis, MO: THGC Publishing, 2015.

Lunde, Henrik Olai. A Warrior Dynasty: The Rise and Fall of Sweden as a Military Superpower, 1611-1721. Philadelphia and Oxford: Casemate, 2014.

Shamenkov, Sergey. Charles XII’s Karoliners. Volume 1: The Swedish Infantry and Artillery of the Great Northern War 1700-1721. Havertown, PA: Helion, 2022.

———. Charles XII’s Karoliners. Volume 2: The Swedish Cavalry of the Great Northern War, 1700-21. Havertown, PA: Helion, 2023.

Sverige. Armén. Generalstaben. Karl XII på slagfältet: Karolinsk slagledning sedd mot bakgrunden av taktikens utveckling från äldsta tider. Vol. 1. Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt & Söner, 1918.

Wolke, Lars Ericson. Svenska knektar: Indelta soldater, ryttare och båtsmän i krig och fred. Lund: Historiska Media, 1995.

Notes

1. Robert I. Frost, The Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558-1721, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 220-22; Gunnar Artéus, Krigsteori och historisk förklaring. II: Karolinsk och europeisk stridstaktik 1700-1712, Meddelanden från Historiska institutionen i Göteborg 5 (Lidköping: Exlibria, 1972), 111-17.↩︎

2. Henrik Olai Lunde, A Warrior Dynasty: The Rise and Fall of Sweden as a Military Superpower, 1611-1721 (Philadelphia and Oxford: Casemate, 2014), 247-52; Frost, Northern Wars, 220-22.↩︎

3. Artéus, Krigsteori och historisk förklaring, 7-25, 111-17. The study explicitly tests the older claim that Carolean tactics were wholly distinct from contemporary European practice.↩︎

4. Frost, Northern Wars, 220-21.↩︎

5. Lars Ericson Wolke, Svenska knektar: Indelta soldater, ryttare och båtsmän i krig och fred (Lund: Historiska Media, 1995), chap. 1; Frost, Northern Wars, 221-22.↩︎

6. Charles XII, Förordning och reglemente för infanteriet som den stormäcktigste konung och herre, herr Carl den XII Sveriges, Götes och Wändes konung, &c. &c. har författa och alle wederbörande til effterrättelse af trycket utgå låtit (Reval: Christoph Brendeken, 1701), sections on exercise, musketeer, pikeman, and grenadier drill; Sergey Shamenkov, Charles XII’s Karoliners. Volume 1: The Swedish Infantry and Artillery of the Great Northern War 1700-1721 (Havertown, PA: Helion, 2022), 9-10.↩︎

7. Frost, Northern Wars, 220-22; Wolke, Svenska knektar, chap. 1.↩︎

8. Shamenkov, Charles XII’s Karoliners, vol. 1, 9, 21-22.↩︎

9. Ibid., 9-10; Artéus, Krigsteori och historisk förklaring, 36-41.↩︎

10. Charles XII, Förordning och reglemente för infanteriet, sections on grenadier drill; Shamenkov, Charles XII’s Karoliners, vol. 1, 10-11.↩︎

11. Sergey Shamenkov, Charles XII’s Karoliners. Volume 2: The Swedish Cavalry of the Great Northern War, 1700-21 (Havertown, PA: Helion, 2023), 13-16; Artéus, Krigsteori och historisk förklaring, 41-56.↩︎

12. Lunde, Warrior Dynasty, 248-50; Artéus, Krigsteori och historisk förklaring, 111-17.↩︎

13. Lunde, Warrior Dynasty, 248-50; Sverige. Armén. Generalstaben, Karl XII på slagfältet: Karolinsk slagledning sedd mot bakgrunden av taktikens utveckling från äldsta tider, vol. 1 (Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt & Söner, 1918), 205-25.↩︎

14. Lunde, Warrior Dynasty, 248-50; Sverige. Armén. Generalstaben, Karl XII på slagfältet: Karolinsk slagledning sedd mot bakgrunden av taktikens utveckling från äldsta tider, vol. 1 (Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt & Söner, 1918), 205-25.↩︎

15. Artéus, Krigsteori och historisk förklaring, 56-70, 111-17; Lunde, Warrior Dynasty, 248-52.↩︎

16. Frost, Northern Wars, 220-22; Lunde, Warrior Dynasty, 251-53.↩︎

17. Artéus, Krigsteori och historisk förklaring, 7-25, 111-17.↩︎